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The international obligations concerning customs duties 
are so much a part of the international life that any change 
of duties or any tariff reform is likely to affect trade 
policy obligations. Although a country could theoretically 
carry out a tariff reform without violating its obligations, 
it has been generally recognised that this would preclude any 
useful reform, whether the reason is to introduce a more 
modern nomenclature or simply to adapt the tariff to a 
changed economic situation. It is quite obvious that all 
these considerations also apply in the case of the creation 
of the ECCM Common External Tariff; the situation is further 
complicated by the fact that the widely different tariffs of 
seven territories are replaced by one instrument. It is the 
aim of this Note to show where the new ECCM Tariff touches 
on trade policy obligations of the ECCM countries and to 
indicate measures to ensure its introduction in conformity 
with international obligations.
In Introducing the subject, attention should be drawn to the 
fact that as long as the countries in question were dependent 
territories, the trade policy obligations were negotiated 
and enforced by the mother country on their behalf. It is 
internationally and generally accepted in the interest of a 
continuity of the trade policy situation, however, that such 
obligations- as those accepted by the U.K. or the regional 
authorities acting under rule on behalf of the territories in 
question - continue to bind the territories even after they 
obtained the right to shape their own economic and trade policy 
affairs. However, this situation in no way prevents the ECCM 
territories from taking any trade policy actions they might 
find necessary, including the right to introduce a new customs

tariff and to negotiate new trade agreements. But any such 
action will have to be carried out, in conformity with 
the established international rules., Further, consideration 
must be given to the limited economic potential of the area and 
the necessity to avoid measures which could conflict with any 
possible future CARIFTA Policy.
THE ECCM TARIFF AND TRADE POLICY OBLIGATIONS
Before entering into the considerations related to the 
effect of trade policy agreements on the ECCM Tariff the 
general trade policy situation as it existed before the 
drafting of the ECCM Tariff shall be outlined briefly.
Before the GATT came into force in 1947. these countries were free 
to grant concessions either on a preferential or a most 
favoured nation basis. The West Indies - Canada 
Agreement of 1925 and the Ottawa Agreement of 1932 - which for 
a long time practically exclusively ruled the trade policy sit­
uation of the countries which now form the EOCM - are the 
most typical examples of preferential arrangements. The idèa 
which was more and more generally accepted that the countries 
should grant to all imports the same treatment (the' so-called 
most favoured nations clause) affected such areas which mainly 
operated under preferential arrangements only in so far as 
imports from non-preferential areas were concerned. The 
enforcement of the GATT provisions in 1947 (which also included 
the countries of the region through an undertaking by the U.K.) 
however, stopped the creation of new preferences and made the 
most favoured nation treatment the key obligation in inter­
national trade relations. GATT also dominated the scene a 
long time with its efforts to encourage countries to reduce their 
imports duties. Recently, however, a new type of approach has 
come into vogue. It consists in the creation of regional 
economic entities (customs unions and free trade areas) which 





trade from duties and other restrictions« The ECCM itself 
is an example of such an entity.
In establishing the duties for the ECCM Common External Tariff 
difficulties arose from the existence of the following 
heterogeneous obligations affecting the preferential rates:
(i) not to increase (absolute) preferential margins 
(GATT)
(ii) to grant minimum relative preferential margins 
(lest Indies - Canada Agreement)
(iii) to ensure minimum (absolute) preferential margins 
(Ottawa).
In order to avoid any trade policy difficulty which could arise 
from the violation of any of these obligation, it was agreed 
at the outset that the best solution was to maintain the present 
preferential margins as far as possible. This decision was, 
however, riot so easy to implement due to the fact that the 
preferential rates of seven territories had to be converted 
into a single preferential rate in the new ECCM Tariff .
To this comes that the trade policy considerations not to 
increase or not to reduce preferential margins ranged, 
regardless of its importance, in second place behind the necessity 
to set up a tariff in conformity with the economic, development 
and financial interest of the region. It is felt that the fact 
that it was nevertheless possible to keep the changes of 
preferential margins in the new ECCM Tariff to a minimum, and 
that the increases of margins have on the whole about the same 
weight as the decreases should - as discussed in detail later - 
satisfy all trade policy partners.
1/ In the absence of a better system this comparison was based as 
far as was logically justifiable on the arithmetical average of 
the old rates.
^ee Annex 1: The ECCM Common External Tariff containing a comparison 
of the average of the old preferential margins with the new pre­
ferential margins. (This Annex was only attached to the original 
copy of this Mote).
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THE ECCM AND THE OTTAWA AGREEMENT
5* The Ottawa Agreement of 1932, the provisions of which are
of decisive importance for the appreciation of the ECCM 
Tariff, affects all Commonwealth Countries including those 
of the ECCM area. It was felt, therefore, that the decision 
of the trade policy obligations of the individual Commonwealth 
countries should be introduced by general considerations 
concerning this Agreement.
6. In the first instance attention shall be drawn to the fact
that it is not as homogeneous a legal instrument as appears
from standard citations. In fact it consists of seven








Three of these Agreements (South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and
New Eoundland) are for various reasons no longer of practical
importance. Pakistan on the other hand which separated
itself in August 1947 from India visibly feels bound by the
Ottawa obligations. The situation is also complicated by the
fact that these Agreements although in principle very similar,
differ in detail. To facilitate the discussion of the
questions involved, the wording of the Agreement with Canada
which is at the same time the most elaborate and the most
3/typical Agreement is attached to this Note —' so as to serve 
as a basis and illustration for the further considerations.
Jj/ See Annex 2; U.K. - Canada Agreement, within the Ottawa Agreement 
of 1932.
y  The countries are given in the same order as in the official
publication "Imperial Economic Conference of Ottawa 1932" (London, 
Stationery Office 4174, 1932). The common date of signature is 
the 20 August 1932.
k.
7. The main provisions of the various Ottawa Agreements are: 
the U.K. undertook in relation to each of the seven
Commonwealth Partners to continue to grant them duty-free 
import treatment of most of their goods (Article IC.A).
The U.K., whose intention was to introduce duties on 
imports from non-preferential areas, even promised to introduce 
for certain products minimum general duties. The Commonwealth 
Countries in relation to the U.K. undertook what may he 
described as as a binding of most preferential margins .
It should be noted that this general obligation refers to the 
absolute margin of preference; that means that if this margin 
was 5$ (15$ general rate, 10$ preferential rate) it must at 
least remain 5$ whatever other duties may be introduced.
8. The non-self-governing territories, including those which now
form the ECCM, were not parties to the Ottawa Agreement. The 
rights and obligations of countries which in 1932 were 
non-self-governing in relation with the Commonwealth 
Partners of the Ottawa Agreement emanates only indirectly from 
the Ottawa Agreement» The U.K. undertook (with exceptions
4/ These are some details:
Canada: Preferential margins (some of them listed) are bound
(Art. 9)
Australia: Preferential margins are fixed (l5$,17.5$ and
20%) and bound (Art. 8)
New Zealand: Preferential margins bound, those higher than 
20% can, however, be reduced to 20$ (Art. 10)
India: More or less generally a preferential margin of 10$ 
is bound (Art. 10 ).

recorded in the Agreement) to ensure that the Colonies accord 
to the Commonwealth Partners to the Agreement "any preference
which may be accorded to any other part of the British
Empire" (e.g. Art. 8 of the Ottawa Agreement with Canada,
(See Annex l) The Commonwealth Partners to the Ottawa
Agreement accorded to these Colonies to grant "any preferences
for the time being accorded to the U.K." (e.g. Art. 19# C.A.).
This obligation is specified inter alia in the case of each
Agreement by a list of preferential margins for numerous items,
probably those which were mainly traded with that area. Canada,
Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, New Poundland and India
further-more reserved the right to withhold preferences in the
case of missing reciprocity (e.g. Art. 19 C.A.).
9. The considerations show clearly that the rights and obligations 
stipulated in the Ottawa Agreements do not create a legal 
obligation for the relation of the dependant terriA 
t.cries (l) with the U.K. and (2) with other U.K. dependencies. 
This fact can be described almost as a constitutional 
accident since it was the visible and successful intention of 
the Ottawa Agreements to create a new economic and political 
orbit in which the relation with the colonies was an integral 
part. This relation with the Colonies would have taken the 
form of an Agreement had they been in a legal position to 
accept obligations in their own name. The fact that they 
could not enter into trade policy obligations in their own name 
was accepted by the Commonwealth Partners to the Ottawa 
Agreement as a natural consequence of their constitutional 
position. It does not seem, possible however, to argue that a
5/ For certain items the parties to the Agreement did not satisfy 
themselves with the general indication that all preferential 
margins in force on the base date ought not to be increased but 
added a list of preferential margins for items of particular 
interest. The special obligation which the U.K. undertook on 
behalf of the Leeward and Windward Island are shown in 
Annex 3.

relation which at the time of the Ottawa Agreement was 
exclusively ruled by internal legislation and administrative 
instructions creates an international obligation for the 
relation of those countries which since 19 32 became independent,, 
It seems therefore that this again leads to the irrefutable 
conclusion that the relation of the non-self-governing 
territories which acceded to economic independence (like 6 of 
the EOOM countries) amongst them, and their relation with 
the U.K. is governed - in so far as they grant preferential 
rights - by the provisions of the Ottawa Agreement de facto
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THE EC CM AND THE WEST INDIES-CANADA TRADE AGREEMENT OF 1925
10. The second preferential Agreement which affects the ECCM region is 
the West Indies~Canada Trade Agreement of 6 July 1925. Although 
this Agreement links the area only to one country, its theoretical 
aspects shall he discussed in connection with the considerations 
concerning the Ottawa Agreement, of which it became a part, in that 
it is explicitly sanctioned in paragraph 20 of the Canadian part
of that Agreement.-^
11. The Agreement was negotiated in so far as the territories of the 
ECCM are concerned, by the Government of Canada on one side and by 
officials from the Leeward and "Windward Islands on the other side.
It was ratified by the Canadian Parliament and approved for the 
islands by the Secretary of State for the Colonies. It is worth­
while noting, however, that it not only comprises the ECCM countries 
but also all other CARIFTA countries as well as the Bahamas, Bermuda,and 
British Honduras.
12. The Agreement obliges Canada to grant to the countries in question 
preferential rates which are half the general rates, while the 
preferential advantages offered by the partner territories are all 
lower; —^ in the case of the Leeward and Windward Islands one-third. ^  
It is worthwhile noting that this obligation to grant preferential 
advantages is expressed in relative figures and therefore differs on 
this point from the Ottawa Agreement where the obligation not to 
increase preferential margins refers to absolute figures. In addition 
to this general obligation each partner undertook to grant minimum 
preferential margins for a limited number of listed items.
6 / See Annex 2.
j J  Jamaica and Bahamas (25%); British Honduras (33 l/dff); 
Barbados, Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago (50^).
8/ The relevant wording of Article 4 of the 1925 Agreement reads ...
the duties .... on all goods .... of Canada .... shall at 





Although the Agreement still binds the partners and there is no 
fault with the clarity of its provisions, a strong feeling always 
prevailed that it should be re-negotiated. This view found its 
clearest expression in the Ottawa Protocol of 8 July 1966 which 
resulted from discussions between Canada and the Commonwealth 
Caribbean countries; this protocol records agreement among all 
participants "to examine the Canada-West Indies Trade Agreement in 
detail with a view to its further amendment or negotiation". The 
reasons for the feeling are numerous; apart from the necessity 
specifically indicated in the Protocol to take into consideration 
the eroding effect which the Kennedy Round had on preferential 
margins, they are mainly:
(i) Adaptation to the new political situation;
(ii) Specialisation if possible, to the CARIPTA area;
(iii) Adaptation to the changed economic situation; and
(iv) Adaptation to the changed trade policy situation.
The Canadian Government has since often repeated its readiness to 
discuss the trade policy situation but had also indicated that the 
initiative must come from the area.
RECIPROCITY REQUIREMENT FOR PREFERENTIAL RATES
Before entering into considerations about the effect of the various 
preferential x'ights and obligations on the ECCM Tariff, reference 
should be made to the decision the ECCM took in conformity with 
CARIFTA to extend preferential rights only to countries which grant 
reciprocity. This decision to require reciprocity will, due to its 
importance for the future trade relation of this area, have to be 
studied carefully if it is to be a useful basis for the trade policy 
relation of this area, and still more if it shall become the basis 
of such important trade policy decisions as to re-negotiate or even 
terminate a trade agreement. One point must be stressed in this 
connection, however, namely that any Trade Agreement contains 
provisions concerning its termination which can be invoked without 
obliging the partner who wishes to terminate the Agreement to give 
its reasons for its decision. In that connection the question of 
receiving or not receiving preferential reciprocity is only one of 





For permitting a clear discussion on the question of reciprocity, 
a question to which reference will be made at various parts of this 
Note, it is necessary to agree on the meaning of this term. It may 
best be explained by a simple example. Country A and country B 
have a law which frees imports of a certain product of the other 
country (e.g. typewriters) from duty. This is legal reciprocity.
If both countries export to the other country the same amount of 
typewriters and therefore both get and receive the same advantage, 
this is undoubtedly material reciprocity. It should be remarked, 
however, that the notion of material reciprocity is not very 
favoured in international relations. The reason is the arbitrary 
moment which is inevitably inherent in any attempt to measure the 
relevant economic factors. In the case of a mutual preferential 
treatment of countries the question may arise which advantages 
should be included and how they should be calculated.
The fact that legal and material reciprocity do occasionally hut 
not always coincide may be seen from the following table — ' which 
contains countries which grant each other legally full preferential
treatment.
TABLE
Trade with countries which, enjoy Q / 
preferential rates in Trinidad & Tobago —'
(in Million ¥.1. dollars)
Country Imports Exports Special preferential
from_________to________advantages granted to TT
U.K. 126 100 Many
Canada 35 41 Some
New Zealand 9 0 None
Australia 6 0 11
Hong Kong 4 0 11
India 2 0 1
Br. Africa 2 2 If
Other 10/ 1 2 1
9a/ This table will be replaced by a table related to the ECCM area.
9/ The f igures are based on the trade of 1968 (Overseas Trade, Jan.1969).
10/ According to footnote in the relevant table of the publications 
(Overseas Trade, Jan. 1969), the "Other" countries comprise 
Malaya, Singapore, Pakistan, Ceylon, Cyprus, Malta, Tanzania,
Zambia, Kenya, Uganda and the Dependence of Commonwealth Countries.
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THE ECCM TARIFF AND THE U.K.
17. The question to he accorded priority in connection with the
introduction of the ECCM tariff is the relation with the U.K. due 
to the important political and economic ties of this country with 
the ECCM region. In substance, it will be important to stress that 
the ECCM Common External Tariff has been prepared in such a way as 
to ensure a smooth continuation of the present trade policy 
situation and in particular also to conform to the spirit of the 
Ottawa provisions and not to increase preferential margins. Of 
course, the fact that the new Tariff is a combination of various 
tariffs made it inevitable that some preferential margins have been 
changed. But decreases of margins for some commodities have on the 
whole to be compensated by increases for others« On one point only 
is the preferential situation different in principle. In the new 
External Tariff, goods required for development purposes are duty­
free regardless of their origin or province. Although this may
seem a restriction of preferential margin it has to be considered
that such items could under special tax incentive provisions 
practically always be imported duty-free from all sources.
18» It has b een mentioned that the trade policy relations of the U.K.
with the ECCM (and vice versa) are not based on a legally binding
international instrument. It has also to be mentioned, however,
that naturally the trade policy relations of these countries
continued de facto to be based on the previous Ottawa status.
In practice this consideration will be of little importance due
to the fact that there seems no interest to change this situation.
The ECCM area appreciates the direct and indirect assistance its
economies receive from the U.K., and the U.K. is visibly prepared
12/to assist this area in its efforts to achieve viability. — ' This 
leaves only room for the suggestion to bring the legal side of the 
situation in conformity with the de facto positions.
11/ See paragraph 9 of this Note.
12/ See Annex 9 (provisional attempt to measure the material 
reciprocity in the case of the relation ECCM-UK).

-12-
19. Attention should he drawn to the fact that any trade policy contact, 
with the U.K. would also have to include considerations concerning 
the countries which are still U.K. dependencies; this includes 
countries which have not yet achieved the stage of full or at least 
economic and trade policy independence. This may he important for ) 
the ECCM countries in the case of territories with a similar pattern 
of production, or still more, in the case of Hong Kong due to its 
importance in the world trade and its interest in commercial relation 
with the ECCM (and of course, the CARIPTA region)»
THE ECCM TARIFF AND CANADA
20» In the case of Canada, as in the case of the U.K., there is no douht 
that the balance of the legal reciprocity is in favour of the ECCM 
countries due to the fact already mentioned that Canada grants 
preferential rates 50$ lower than the general rates while the 
preferential advantage granted by the ECCM Countries is only 33 l/3$. 
The balance of the preferential advantages granted and received on 
trade (material reciprocity), however, inevitably must he less 
favourable for the ECCM in the case of Canada than in the case of 
the U.K. due to the fact that Canada (with the exception of a
certain semi-governmental assistance granted to West Indian sugar 
exports) does not grant special advantages.
21. On the basis of the documents made available, it can easily be
14/proved — J that the ECCM Tariff conforms to the greatest possible f 
degree with the provisions of the West Indies-Canada Agreement^in 
particular the obligation that the preferential rates should not be, 
higher than 2/3 of the general rates. - This should make it
13/ See Annex 5, Considerations concerning the material reciprocity 
in the case of the relations ECCM-Canada. l
14/ See footnote 1 of this Note.
15/ It should be remarked that this is more so in the case of Canada 
than of the U.K. due to the fact that the introduction of a 0/0$ 
duty is no breach of the West Indies-Canada Agreement since ,L 
mathematically the difference between the general and prefer­
ential rate ' also in such a case, remains l/3. (Disregarding 




possible to introduce this new tariff with no criticism from the 
Canadian side. However, the possible imbalance of the advantages 
given and received m a y  raise the wish on the side of the ECCM to 
make use of the Canadian offer, so often repeated, to enter into 
trade discussions with Canada with a view not only of obtaining a 
more balanced Agreement, but also to replace the old Agreement made 
under politically different conditions by a new arrangement.
22. To this suggestion should be added, however, that the economic ties
with Canada are so strong that under no condition should this
relation be put in danger. Even more than in the case of the
relation with other countries, the relation of Canada with the
CARIFTA has to be respected so that no trade policy action should
be undertaken before the common CARIFTA trade policy line has been 
established.
ECCM TARIFF AND AUSTRALIA
23. The trade policy relation of Australia with this region is probably
the most difficult to analyse. While the ECCM countries apply the 
preferential rates provided for U.K. imports to all imports from 
Australia,in conformity with the U.K. - Australian part of the 
Ottawa Agreement, the ECCM countries do not get the same treatment 
in Australia. Occasionally it was mentioned that Australia had 
stated that it was prevented from granting full preferential rights 
to this region under the GATT obligation not to extend preferential 
rates beyond those applied on the base date established by GATT (1947),
since it had not granted preferential rates to this region on or
before that date for the simple reason that there were no imports.
If this statement was really made it is not on the records of GATT 
nor did it take the form of any sort of agreement. -1^/ In any case 
it would not have been acceptable to GATT the relevant obligations
16/ It is known that a similar measure was taken by Australia in 
1947 against imports from New Zealand. This case has been 
solved by a "List Agreement" in which New Zealand requested and 
got preferential concessions on certain goods of interest to 
its trade.
16a/ Will be checked in GATT in December 1969.
«
of which undoubtedly only envisage the legal and not the factual 
situation. Whatever the motivation was, however, the visible fact 
remains that the ECCM countries are not listed in the Australian 
tariff under the areas which have unlimited access to preferential 
rates.
24. The Australian Government stresses, however, that the Australian
Tariff provides special reduced rates (often identical with the
preferential rates) for "Declared Preference Countries" which
comprise the Leeward and the Windward Islands for such selected
17/goods as for example spices and certain tropical fruits. •— ' The
concessions, it is alleged, cover more items than the region can r 
export at present. Australia also points at its newly introduced 
provisions (1968) under which it grants developing countries (the 
ECCM countries are listed as possible beneficiaries in this 
connection) preferential rates for a considerable amount of imports. 
This system which consists in preferential rates attributed in the 
form of tariff quotas to developing countries has found the unanimous 
approval of GATT. It is felt, however, that due to its exclusively 
unilateral application it cannot enter the consideration concerning 
the bilateral trade policy relations existing between the ECCM 
countries and Australia.
TRADE POLICY RELATION WITH THE OTHER COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES
25o The relation of the ECCM countries with those Commonwealth countries 
which were Parties to the Ottawa Agreement are of a special 
importance for the ECCM region, as this Agreement stipulates 
explicitly the rights and obligations of the "non-self-governing- 
territories" which comprised the countries which now form the ECCM. 
Apart from Canada and Australia, which have been discussed separately, 
practically only India and New Zealand and possibly Pakistan remain 
to be considered. It has already been mentioned that under the
11/  An example of interest to the region are the duties on Nutmeg 
and Mace: 12.5$ general, (rfo preferential, 0$ DPC countries.
See paragraph 6 of this Note«
«
H
Ottawa Agreement ECCM goods received from these countries the 
same preferential treatment as imports from the U.K. It remains to 
be discussed the relation of the ECCM countries with those territories 
which - being colonies in 1932 - were not Parties to the Ottawa 
Agreement and which became independent since. Although the ECCM 
countries are not bound by a formal trade policy obligation to these 
Commonwealth Territories which were no active parties to the Ottawa 
Agreement} they grant to all of them preferential treatment. There 
will be many under them which could claim that they, true to the 
spirit of the Ottawa Agreement, reciprocate fully and give de facto 
preferential treatment to the ECCM area.
26. The trade relations with both these groups of countries - those 
formally entitled to preferential treatment under the Ottawa 
provisions and those not entitled - are very limited and the trade 
which exists (if any) flows almost exclusively in the direction of 
the ECCJ/I. This could make it that the ECCM would be interested in 
revising its trade policy relations with these countries. It must 
be mentioned however, that a wide field has to he covered by the 
ECCM before it can decide on these questions, a fact which is taken 
into consideration in connection with the suggestions concerning the 
practical relation of the necessary trade policy action,
TRADE POLICf RELATION WITH THE NON-PBEFERENTIAL AREA
27. This Note up to this point almost exclusively deals with the relation 
of th e ECCM countries with countries receiving preferential treatment, 
simply because ,with the exception of the participation in GATT,practically no 
trade policy contacts outside the preferential arrangements existed.
In the long run, however, trade policy relations on the basis of 
the most favoured nation treatment will become important. Although 
the area must he aware of this fact it must also he accepted that it 
may take some time before the necessity of such trade policy contacts 
will arise.
%
THE EC CM TARIFF AND GATT
28. In introducing the cotisiderabi aos roiic ¿Tiling the question how the 
GATT provisions affect the introduction of the ECCM Tariff, 
attention must he drawn to the fate that the ECCM (collectively, 
but also the ECCM countries individually) may in its contacts with 
GATT meet with certain prO'sedrraC difficulties. These difficulties,
¿however,, bars im;-i hi tig ro oj with the ECCM Tariff but with the fact 
that the svaiue of the ECCM countries in GATT has not yet been 
adapted to thei.t new political situation and that the formation of 
the ECCM has not passed the GATT scrutiny which is a common procedure 
in the ea.se of the erection of free trade areas and customs unions.
In this connect.:!on, it must be recognised that in the interest of 
a harmonious economic development of the region, absolute priority 
must be given to the introduction of the ECCM Tariff over any 
procedural or similar consideration. How strong this feeling 
influences the region may be seen from the fact that the ECCM 
Agreement - the creation of which is affected by similar constitutional, 
and procedural, difficulties as the introduction of the ECCM Tariff - 
has been enforced, and operates sc, far simply by avoiding action in 
GATT. This statement should not pass, however, without the equally 
clear qualification that:, with the necessary understanding and 
co-operation of all concerned, it should be possible without too 
great an effort to remove 01 to avoid these procedural obstacles. v•v
29. In the discussion of the points relevant to this Note, namely the
conformity of the ECCM Taxiif with the GATT provisions, the first
question to "be auied is, whe fcher the ECCM is bound in its? free
selection ex duties, e.g. not to impose duties higher than those in
force on a certain bast' date. In this connection it must be noted
that GATT, against an oxter! expressed but erroneous view, does not
contain any provision which limits the right to increase duties.
It operates in a diiferent way. Countri es can only become GATT 
19 /members-"“ '" after '!-?rifi uegofci at ion s. They are also later encouraged
29/ A provision which is p.cactica'n.y suspended for developing 
countries to facilitate their access to GATT,

to reduce their rsis* in yenn'iv Dt;orv -• trie best known of which 
was i.he Kennedy 'Round, Aj. i. vravhb' ■„.oneecsio.ns (whieh, once accepted 
are listed in connfry Schedule cl ■: t eeee never t,.as negotiations a 
multilateral obligation amonga.; GATT members. These concessions 
are guaranteed by the GATT ybJcgctlcv iuooiiiJ on its members not 
to increase the do.ties ii sied on the schedules beyond the
negotiated rates. Such tout if concession}-. would also hind the ECCM
territories if the r,K. had aravscrad - ho she did for other
dependencies - any such obligation or; 'bo.ra.lx of them» —— It is
therefore importaot to noie that the Et'TM countries consequently 
have fall freedom uo fir the duties be. the now Common. External Tariff 
according to their economic needs',
30. There is however, one other GATT prevision related to duties which 
directly affects the ECCM tariff aid indirectly limited the choice'
of duties, namely, the GATT_yblirsryen not to increase preferential
 20/ ' ' ' ' —margins — - whieh was drafted as a iompromise solution between the
wish of some countri.es to remove prrrrccca fully and base the
whole world trade era most fax taro,]. nation treatment, and the wish
of other countries to hate a free hand i.a negotiating preferential
arrangements. This obligation •«•hie is GATT originally interpreted
very narrowly, is nowadays seen ¡icr ■ is the light of the necessity
of assisting developing cornIrice it their economic development.
31. It has to be admitted in this c«B.nt.eftcu, that; in the case of a few 
items the new tariff leads r-o the increase of preferential margins.
In any other environment ever. rich a minor increase of a ■
preferential margin would be considered a breach of the strict 
GATT obligation and would, to be i d e v  j fed, require a special 
permission called in the GATT jargon, a "''waiver!<. It has been
i
19a/ The correctness of this straiem'raf will be checked in
December .19(19 in GATT, if three shonjd fee concessions they 
would be minimal.
20/ This oblige it ion explicitly rt.icïv tv I,he 'absolute'' margin 
which ought not r.o be increased « (The obligations in the 
Ottawa Agreement vrhioh. r.-quii i-u preferential margins to he 
maintained, is equally based on ■ absolute” margins. See 
paragraph 7 of this Note,)
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recognized by GATT, however, that increases of preferential margins
which are the inevitable result of a tariff reform are not to be
looked at as an isolated problem but are in conformity with GATT
if "on the whole" - as in the case of the ECCM Tariff - the
21 /preferential rights have not been increased, —
2l/ The relevant precedent is the approval of the Contracting 
parties to GATT of the Report of a Working Party dealing 
with the Malawi tariff reform (early 1969).

SUGGESTIONS CONCERNING THE INTERNATIONAL 
INTRODUCTION OF THE BCCM TARIFF
The introduction ox 'the ECCM Tariff touchec in many 
ways on trade policy obligations, It is important 
that the countries which could claim trade policy 
rights are given a fair opportunity to reassure 
themselves that the ECCM Tariff does not violate 
their interests. If the preceding part of this Note 
was devoted to considerations concerning the trade 
policy relation of the ECCM with various countries and 
the efforts to establish the Common External Tariff 
in such a way as to be in conform!ty with all possible 
and justified wishes, it is the aim of this part of 
the Note to sketch a procedure which should facilitate 
a smooth international introduction of the ECCM Tariff,
The U.K. is the most important country in the Trade 
Policy relation of the ECCM, The main question in this 
connection is at what moment the ECCM Tariff would best 
be made available to the U.K. authorities» This could 
be done before its acceptance by the ECCM Council of 
Ministers or after its legal enforcement« Neither of the 
two solutions, it seems however, are satisfactory. To 
discuss the C.E.T. before its approval would certainly 
be premature as it cannot he foreseen whether the Council 
of Ministers will approve the new tariff, and even if 
the Council accepts the new tarsif in principle, whether 
it will be accepted without changes. To present the new 
tariff to the U.K. after final approval fey the Council 
of Ministers could, .regardless of the effort to respect 
the U.K. interests, have unpleasant trade policy 
consequences if the U.K. would find fault with this procedure. 
To overcome this difficulty the foil owing solution is

suggested; the Council of Ministers should - after 
having accepted that Tariff in principle - postpone 
its enforcement (e.g. for 3 months), and present 
the Tariff to the (J.K# authorities with a view to 
obtain agreement to its enforcement»
In the case of the relation with some of the other 
countries claiming preferential rights, it has been 
shown that some countries grant considerable rights 
to the ECCM area, while others grant hardly any0 It 
is quite obvious that the ECCM countries will have 
the wish to re-negotiate or even terminate some 
of these relations,, It should be stressed with 
all emphasis, however, that under no circumstances 
should this be done by unilateral action in that for 
example the sop...usability of the preferential rates would 
not be extended to such a country. Any such unilateral 
actions would inevitably cause in the long run 
immeasurable damage to the ECCM countries themselves.
The right way - and by no means complicated way - to 
achieve any change in trade policy relations is through 
negotiations. The only solution, to assure the continuity 
of the present situation and at the same time prepare 
for trade negotiations is to maintain for the interim 
period the present preferential situation and to grant 
the preferential rates contained in the new ECCM Tariff 
to all countries which always received preferential 
treatment# This system has the further invaluable 
advantage of not disturbing any future common CARIFTA 
action# It should also be added that there need not to 
be any fear that this would affect the customs revenue 
adversely, not only because it is a continuation of the 
present situation but mainly for the reason that the trade 
with countries, the ECCM may wish to discontinue eventually, 
preferential rights, is very small#

That means for the parser ,/tl "Ppl i cation that the 
ECCM c can tree'- - e w e  the i¿OCM Tt. r j .1 f has been approved 
by the Coo.r.v; x 1, von} d e r r  to inf eras the relevant 
Comroonwea 1 th couninrs of the fact Chat this tariff, 
which will replace t Le p i t s e v e n  tariffs of the 
member c i m s t m s  of the ECCM, rill become effective 
in the near future it , g .■ m  1 .1.970 j, and that
provis icnal!y the rater contained in the preferential 
column apply to all. ;Vomn>on.ee a 1 th countries, Together 
with this noti f )r::ationt, the tablet showing the relation
of the average aid prefer r;n ,ai margins as compared with
99 ■'the new pref erea.t i al raars in “™'' could be sent to the 
countries so as to pe rrsi 1 1 them to ascertain not only 
that their proferentiaL rights have been maintained, 
but also that the new rater have bean introduced in 
conformity with the GATT obligations, The countries 
could also oe informed t bat the ECCM countries intend 
to consolidate eventualiy their trade policy positions 
and to conclude new Trade Agreements to replace the 
out-dated present situation.
Regarding the question vh*v<> GATT should be contacted to 
discuss (he ECCM tariff. it seems .right to say that even 
if time would permit such a contact before its approval 
by the EGCM C crane 1 I of Ministers this does not seem 
possible, it should be suggested} even that the Tariff 
should be handed to GATT only af ¡;er it became effective.
See footnote o this No te>

vii h the se countries conic". lead to changes of rates
accompanied by "all do cnne nt at ion proving that on. the 
whole 'referential rights have not been increased. ■
Should GATT insist to convene a 'forking Party it can
he assumed that under the existing circa’.stances it
would be a pure fornaiity
37« The necessity that the SCCM countries take trade
policy action will arise sooner or later . Befit that 
the U .K,, or another Commonwealth Country or GATT wish 
to discuss questions related t o  the iL’CCIi Tariff or to 
other trade policy questions affecting the region. It 
is therefore necessary that the EC CM prepares itself 
in time for such negotiations and takes the necessary 
measures to act efficiently as a trade policy unit.
To ensure this, it is suggested that the Council of 
Ministers should authorize a body or institution to 
represent officially the member countries individually 
and the ECCM collectively in all trade policy actions.
It is felt that if the ECCM Secretariat would probably 
he the best choice for that purpose, and that the trade 
policy functions should, be entrusted to it, if this lias 
not been done yet. Of course, internally every institution 
which represents the ECCM in tra.de policy matters would have 
to seek authorization froa the .ember countries before 
taking a decision.
See paragraph 2 6  of this Hote 
See footnote 0 o d.i.; Note.

SUMMARY
The long and turbulent political and economic history 
of the region reflects itself in complicated, outdated 
and often difficult trade policy provisions0 The main 
aim of this Kote is not to describe this situation 
beyond the necessity of giving background information 
but to show a way to come to new and satisfactory trade 
policy relations.
The main message which this Note wishes to convey in 
this connection may be summarized as follows:
, the region can only represent its trade
policy interests efficiently if it acts as 
a group« (Within the ECCM for the time being 
and within CARIPTA as soon as possible.)
it is possible to move from the present 
difficult and unclear trade policy relations 
to a clear and satisfactory trade policy 
situation; and finally
, that this can be achieved not only without 
friction with Third Countries but also 
efficiently and fast»
Summing up the relevant procedural provisions it should be 
remarked that this cannot be made without explaining that 
they are the result of a careful consideration aimed at giving 
as many benefits to the ECCM area as possible, the most important 
of which may be listed in concluding this Rote:
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the procedure has all advantages of an 
unilateral action but remains strictly 
within any possible trade policy obligations.
it avoids any legal or other controversy and 
assures in friendship a continuity of the 
present trade policy relation.
although the Trade Policy Partners are given 
full opportunity to discuss any point before 
the ECCM Tariff will be enforced they can and 
probably will accept the Tariff without any 
action from their side due to the complete 
documentation which can be made available to 
them and which proves that the new tariff not 
only respects the bilateral but also the 
GATT obligation;
it gives the ECCM region the possibility 
to make it clear that it is the intention to 
terminate all unsatisfactory arrangements and 
to put eventually its trade policy relation on 
a new basis in conformity with its changes 
political and economic situation*,
recognizes that any trade policy action ought 
to keep the door open for any future common 
CARIFTA trade policy»
and finally, and for the practical application 
most important, the suggested procedure is very simple 
in that it requires only one action on the side of 
the ECCM countries, namely, an appropriate 
Notification of the Commonwealth Countries 
and GATT,

- 2 5 - A n n e x  I
THE ECCM COMMON EXTERNAL TARIFF
Containing 
a comparison of the average of the old 
preferential margins with the new pref-* 
erential margins provided for the ECCM
- This Annex was only attached to 
the original copy of this Note -
* Using the SITC old (before the introduction of the 




G QMS ITERATIONS CONCERNING- THE (MATERIAL)
RECIPROCITY IN THE CASB OF THE RELATION 
BOOM - CANADA
The importance of the trade of the CARIFTA Area with Canada
may be seen from the fact that Canada, is one of the most important 
buyers, of" ECCM goods. There seems, however, to be an imbalance of 
preferential advantages» See e.g. Article "West Indian Preferences to 
Canadian Exports" (publication of the University of the West Indies, 
Jamaica "West Indies - Canada Economic Relations’,' page 49) mainly in two 
points, (lj 100% ci the West Indian exports got preferential treatment, 
95$ from Canada in .1338, a figure which had shrunk to 52$ already in
1956 No corresponding figure given for GAEIPTA imports from Canada
but it should still move around 90$ . As a reason for this development 
is given Canada's shift to imports of bauxite and petroleum.'. (?)
As a result of various multilateral Tariff Negotiations in CATT the 
preferential margins were reduced by Canada e.g. for the following 
products: raw cocoa', grapefiii.it, orange-juice,and abolished on Coffee,
To this can be added that Canada, since the Ottawa Protocol, no 
longer grants the important shipping facilities’ which were included 
in the 1925 Agreement,
* The considerations in this Annex are provisional and shall








UNITED KINGDOM-CANADIAN AGREEMENT * ,
(Part of the Ottawa Agreement of 1932) —'
WE,' the representatives of His Majesty's Government in the United 
Kingdom and of His Majesty’s Government in Canada hereby agree with 
one another, on behalf of our respective Governments,as follows:-
ARTICLE 1.
His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom undertake that 
Orders shall be made in accordance with the provisions of Section 4 of 
the Import Duties Act, 1932, which will ensure the continuance after 
the 15th November, 1932» of entry free of duty into the United Kingdom
of goods consigned from any part of the British Empiré, and grown,
produced or manufactured in Canada, which by virtue of that Act are now 
free of duty subject, however, to the reservations set forth in Sched­
ule A appended hereto.
ARTICLE 2.
His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom will invite Parlia­
ment to pass the legislation necessary to impose on the foreign goods 
specified in Schedule B appended hereto, the duties of customs shown 
in that Schedule in place of the duties (if any) now leviable.
ARTICLE 3-
His Majesty’s‘ Government in the United Kingdom undertake that the 
general ad valorem duty of 10 per cent, imposed by Section I of the
Import Duties Act, 1932, on the foreign goods specified in Schedule C
shall not be reduced except with the consent of His Majesty's Govern­
ment in Canada.
ARTICLE 4.
It is agreed that the duty on either wheat in grain, copper, zinc 
or lead, as provided in this agreement, may be removed if at any time 
Empire producers of wheat in grain, copper, zinc and lead respectively 
are unable or unwilling to offer these commodities on first sale in 
the United Kingdom at prices not exceeding the world prices and in 
quantities sufficient to supply the requirements of the United Kingdom 
consumers.
Schedules Annexed are not reproduced.

His Maj -:y '■ s Gov r n n v n  >. :e ¡.he United K ¡oyA-m w Pi s.nviit Parliament
to pass the .J v » ; s Ivvfir v .>, e ° e e ss a ¡.y, to modify the cent t fi= ors at. present
governing t.b e , rue r'uv., v-e ;.o • o rijf. ry i i ■¡¡■g T(i fjo ruj-Ti V!! P?? rattle from Canada
on the ! Pres a I r >:■ a;": y r e s t spun ;.r r..; o,>i~o pt; between t a cm s o i re s and His
Majesty's <k t or roe-' at Pi  t o n e  v ,
HIT P,  PE h.
H i s  M.tj r “ i . o - G o v e  rnoier-1 o " f u  U . P P c d  Ki ngdom do«" i are t h a t  ' i t  i s  t h e i r  
i n t e n t i o n  to ar.i s t t o  os s oon re  or s sPP-  e a f t e r  r e c e ' T t n g  the r e p o r t  o f  t he
Commi s s i o n  c o r  i U ' t j  ¡.v ; l; ,: r  eo t f;.?i\: s ¿y- i  on i t  Hr« P i g  I n d u s t r y  i n  t he
U n i t e d  Kingdom.,,  roe  : 7 p t n :  r  :-u~ t ‘ h > ;"„>t i t* u":? i r e  s'apjj!  ; e s  o f  b a c o n  and
hams cotniug t o  to ■.-;■■■ IP-:>' : ri  Pi  u :,Ae ;e rit>rk. '<:. c r y  c -  ;j >■r v. tit - t h a t  i n  any l e g i s -
l a t i o n  v/bieh r h e y  mo ,• . r i i t  1 a ,  Fami '  ament ■;:.■« ¡ a y t ’ a i a i a  t he  s u p p l i e s  of 
b a c o n  and bams f rom c i i  sourer; . -  ■<■. to the P e i t r A  Ki ngdom.  nr or-1 s i on w i l l  he 
made f o r  f r e e  end ry  s i  Oared t a a ha t e n  ard cotr  o f  200 d - ¡ ' j a i i  dy up t o  a m a x i ­
mum of 2, 5U;J, 000 m  , pe 1 aiinuuu
ART! OLE: 7
His M a p  i'e hy s « Po-v ? r ivre et > .at P'ortcd Kingdom ’«..in invite Parliament
to pass 13i>i. s !. e t i 0 e which it i 1 1 i 1. is? a period of ten. years from the
date hereof to lobtnao -vans - good ? rom any pfi.vt c i the British Empire and 
grown, produced os ¡v.h-- ■< Pr turn: r! i n Can ad a the existing mat g in of preference 
over foreign coherer, so l o n g , Poterc e r, as the du f.y an foreign unmanufactured
tobacco does riot iaS.i ha b n  2- . tad- tv • 17 - i a which event 'the margin of
preference shall to equal o the PP J duty,
.ARTICLE fi-
His Majesty's Govemmem. in the Uni ted Kingdom mil invite the Govern­
ments of the no n- sc 1 f-¿or er ?i 1 eg Go's oni.es and Pt e t e v to j ai; e s to accord to Canada 
any preference wlp eh may for the time 'being Fe at carded to any other part of 
the British Em pi 1.0 , provided that tin s Clause shall uo-t extend to any prefer­
ences accorded Lt Sir i iiet’si Hlsmi-t ; a to Pie’ Union of South Africa,. Southern 
Rhodesia and the Thru i < or its u f t h e  South Art scar, Tp eh Commi s si on by virtue 
of the Cust onis Agrcome!.': if 1: Q SO . and Pn r her el j j 1 to, ; f e the Governments
of the Co ' tat?.-: arid Pro i (u tv .otcs shti t e S r h e d u l  e B ■ o accord to Canada
new or additional pro- i'e r cnee 1 n the < mrmo d > ¡.nr -md a t the rates shown there­
in,
H i s  M a j r v f y ' s  Gov e r n me nt  i J- Cvnin'L;. w A: ; i r r n i c  Pur L anje a t to p a s s  the  
l e g i s l a t i o n  e j ,  ■eum.y  At su Us >. 11 •; ? v s ;; ? rur- A) , i t s  o f  t us turns row l e v i a b l e
on t h e  g o o d s  y u ' I  > <■ fi j y> S-Utcdi! i c B ¡he du ' " ■ s she-..'? • v i h a i  S c h e d u l e

provided that nothing in this Article shall preclude His 
Majesty’s Government in Canada from reducing the duties specified 
in the said Schedule so long as the margin of British preference 
shown in that Schedule is preserved or from increasing the rates 
under the intermediate or general tariff set out in the said Schedule,
ARTICLE 10.
Hi's Majesty’s Government in Canada undertake that protection 
by tariffs shall be afforded against United Kingdom products only to 
those industries which are reasonably assured of sound opportunities
for success.
ARTICLE 11,
His Maj es t y 's Government in Canada undertake that during the 
currency of this Agreement thé tariff shall be based on the principle 
that protective duties shall not exceed such a level as will give 
United Kingdom producers full opportunity of reasonable competition 
on the basis of the relative cost of economical and efficient pro­
duction, provided that in the application of such principle special 
consideration shall be given to the case of industries not fully 
established,
ARTICLE 12.
His Majesty's Government in Canada undertake forthwith to con­
stitute the Tariff Board, for which provision is made in the Tariff 
Board Act, 1931»
ARTICLE 13.
His Majesty’s Government in Canada undertake that on the request 
of His Majesty *s Government in the United Kingdom they will cause a 
reviéw to be made by the Tariff Board as soon as practicable of the 
duties charged on any commodities specified in such request in accord­
ance with the principles laid down in Article 11 hereof, and that 
after the receipt of the Report of the Tariff Board thereon such report 
shall he laid before Parliament, and Parliament shall be invited to 
vary wherever necessary the Tariff on such commodities of United King­
dom origin in such manner as to give effect to such principles.
ARTICLE 14.
His Majesty's Government in Canada undertake that no existing duty 
shall be increased on United Kingdom goods except after an inquiry and 
the receipt of a report from the Tariff Board, and in accordance with 
the facts as found by that body.
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His Majesty's Government in Canada undertake that United Kingdom 
producers shall be entitled to full rights of audience before the Tariff 
Board when it lias under consideration matters arising under Articles 13 
and 14 hereof,
ARTICLE 16,
His Majesty’s Government in Canada undertake that Customs administration 
in Canada shall be governed by such general principles as will ensure (a) 
the avoidance, so far as reasonably possible, of uncertainty as to the 
amount of Customs duties and other fiscal imposts payable on the arrival 
of goods in Canada; (b) the reduction of delay and friction to a minimum; 
and (c) the provision of machinery for the prompt and impartial settle­
ment of disputes in matters appertaining to the application of tariffs.
ARTICLE 17.
His Majesty's Government in Canada undertake that all existing sur­
charges on imports from the United Kingdom shall be completely abolished 
as soon as the finances of Canada will allow. They further undertake to 
give sympathetic consideration to the possibility of reducing and ultim­
ately abolishing the exchange dumping duty in so far as it applies to 
imports from the United Kingdom.
ARTICLE 18.
His Majesty’s Government in Canada undertake to modify the existing 
regulations governing the importation of pedigree stock from the United 
Kingdom into Canada in a manner already agreed upon in principle between 
themselves and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.
ARTICLE 19.
His Majesty’s Government in Canada undertake to accord to those non­
self-governing Colonies, Protectorates and the Mandated Territories to 
which the benefits of the British preferential rates are at present 
accorded, and also to Zanzibar the preferences on the commodities and at 
the rates shown in Schedule F, and also any preferences for the time being 
accorded to the United Kingdom. Provided that His Majesty's Government 
in Canada shall not be bound to continue to accord any preferences to any 
Colony or Protectorate which, not being precluded by international obli­
gations from according preferences, either (i) accords to Canada no prefer­
ences, or (ii) accords to some other part of the Empire (in the case of 
Northern Rhodesia, excepting the Union of South Africa, Southern Rhodesia 
and the Territories of the South African High Commission) preferences not 
accorded to Canada.
A R T I C L E  1 5 .
i
A R T I C L E  2 0 .
Nothing in this Agreement shall prejudice or diminish any of the 
benefits enjoyed by any of the parties thereto under the Canada-Vest 
Indies Trade Agreement dated the 6th July, 1925,
ARTICLE 21.
This Agreement is made on the express condition that, if either 
Government is satisfied that any preferences hereby granted in respect 
of any particular class of commodities are likely to be frustrated in 
whole or in part by reason of the creation or maintenance directly 
or indirectly of prices for such class of commodities through State 
action on the part of any foreign country, that Government hereby 
declares that it will exercise the powers which it now has or will 
hereafter take to prohibit the entry from such foreign country directly 
or indirectly of such commodities into its country for such time as may 
he necessary to make effective and to maintain the preferences hereby 
granted by it.
ARTICLE 22.
This Agreement between His Majesty's Government in the United 
Kingdom and His Majesty's Government in Canada is to be regarded as 
coming into effect as from the date hereof (subject to the necessary 
legislative or other action being taken as soon as may he practicable 
hereafter)« It shall remain in force for a period of five years, and 
if not denounced six months before the end of that period shall con­
tinue in force thereafter until a date six months after notice of 
denunciation has been given by either party.
ARTICLE 23.
In the event of circumstances arising which, in the judgment of 
His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom or of His Majesty's 
Government in Canada, as the case may be, necessitate a variation in 
the terms of the Agreement, the proposal to vary those terms shall 
form the subject of consultation between the two Governments.

-31- Annex 3
SPECIAL-PREFERENTIAL RIGHTS GRANTED IS THE 
OTTAWA AGREEMENT BY THE U.K. ON BEHALF 
OE THE LEEWARD AKD WIjTOWARD ISLANDS)
(See paragraph 8 of this Note)
U.K. Canada Agreement




Rubber boots and shoes and 
canvas boots ans shoes, 
rubber soled
Motor vehicles, parts and tyres
Hosiery of cotton or artificial silk 
Hosiery of silk
Butter
Pitch pine (Antigua, only)
1 s. per pair
6 d. per pair
9 d, per pair
!§• d. per lb.
10 sh. per 1000 ft. 
(on the basis of a 
general duty assim­
ilated to the duty 
of other wood)
B U.K. Australia Agreement
(Article 7 and ex Schedule E)
Butter l|r d. per lb.
1
Annex 4
ATTEMPT TO MEASURE THE (MATERIAL) RECIPROCITY 
1ST THE CASE OF THE RELATION 




Sugar (Calculated scheme of Antigua 
1.5% of the recently estimated 
total CARIFTA advantage of 
50 million) 0.75
Bananas (half the advantage estimated 
for Jamaica in 1958. 6.-
Other ECCM exports ?
Total 7-8
Advantages presented to UK imports
(estimated on the basis of the 
calculated figure for St. Lucia) 6-7
The table in this Annex is provisional and based on not 
comparable figures taken from various sources. It shall 
eventually be replaced by a table based on statistical 
figures.
H* *
h
